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RATE OF

EXCHANGE IN

JUDGMENTS

OBTAINED

ON

FOREIGN

OBLIGATIONs-Fluctuation in the value of foreign currencies during
the last few years has brought on an unusual amount of litigation over
the question of what rate of exchange should be applied in translating
a foreign debt into the money of the jurisdiction where suit is brought,
in order to give a judgment. The problem can be most clearly stated
through an illustration. A owes B iooo francs in 1915 when five
francs were worth a dollar. In 1920, when a dollar would buy ten
francs, let us say, B sues A in America to recover the debt. Of
course, the judgment must be in dollars. But a number of possible
rates of exchange present themselves, according to which the conversion from francs to dollars might be made. (i) There is the
exchange that existed upon the date that the obligation first became
due, (2) the date that suit was brought, (3) the date that judgment
1
The last two
is given, or (4) the date of execution of judgment.
delay while the
the
that
of these may be objected to on the ground
suit is in progress is likely to alter the rights of the parties, and
cause unnecessary hardship. The exchange of the date on which
suit was brought escapes this objection, while the theory to support
the application of this rate does not differ radically from the theories
under which the other two rates would be applied. It is proposed,
then, to discuss the merits of applying the rate upon the date of suit
as opposed to the exchange rate which existed on the date when the
obligation first became due-whether from tort or from breach of
contract or from any other cause. For convenience this will be called
the breach date.
If one rule worked a more equitable result than the other, that
might be a good reason for adopting it. But it will be seen that undeserved hardship follows the application of either one. Suppose
that B is an American who has spent 20o dollars on the goods which
he has sold to A, a Frenchman, in 1915, and for which A, at that time,
owes him iooo francs. If the rate of exchange of the date suit is
brought-I92o--were employed in converting the francs into dollars,
B would get only IOO dollars. This does not seem fair to him. But
if the debt were owed in dollars, then if the breach date rule is applied, A must pay 2ooo francs, which seems unfortunate. On the
other hand, if the franc had gone up instead of down, and the debt
were owed in francs, B would profit by the suit date rule; but A
would only have to pay half the amount of his debt in dollars according to the breach date rule. Again, if A and B were both Frenchmen
who had transacted an ordinary piece of business in France to the
value of IOOO francs in 1915, it would seem most unjust to permit
'For other possible dates see Edward Gluck, The Rate of Exchange in the
Law of Damages, 22 COLUMBIA L. REv. 217, 218 (1922).
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B to recover the equivalent of 200o francs, just because he happened to catch A in America in i92o. The suit date rule would obviously be the fairer in that case.
It might be suggested, at this point, that the intention of the
parties in making the contract should govern the rate of exchange
to be used. For example, in the case of the two Frenchmen, it is
plain they never thought of anything but francs at the time the obligation was incurred. But the futility of that rule is fully exposed
when a case in'which one of the parties is a Frenchman and the
other an American is considered. Their mutual intention could not
be guessed; it is quite unlikely that they had a mutual intention concerning this question. Similarly, if it were attempted to formulate a
rule based on the domicile of the parties, the obstacle would be that
often each had a different domicile.
The problem of equities can be approached from another direction. Since the debtor is the defaulting party it might be hoped that
he would be the one to suffer by the rise or fall of the market; at
least he should not profit at the expense of the blameless creditor.
If a rule could be devised that would make it unprofitable for him to
gamble on the exchange by withholding the payment of his debt, that,
doubtless, would be a good rule to adopt. Neither the breach date
nor the suit date rules, however, accomplish this end. Suppose that
A owes B iooo francs in France, and that suit is brought in America. Then, if the franc is falling, as measured by the dollar, A an
American, with all his money in dollars, can defer payment to his
own profit, under the suit date rule. But if A is a Frenchman, he
will reap no direct profit under this rule, though he might gain indirectly by investing the amount of his debt in dollars. According to the
breach date rule A, the American, would neither lose nor gain by deferring payment; but A, the Frenchman, would lose. Thus, under the
suit date rule in a falling franc market, the American debtor gains
directly, and the French debtor gains indirectly; while under the
breach date rule, the American debtor, by deferring payment, neither
gains nor loses, and the French debtor loses. Now, if the franc is rising, the other facts of the case being the same, the position of the winners and losers is exactly reversed. Thus, there is no choice between
the two rules so far as the equities are concerned.2 It should be observed, too, that if the suit for Iooo francs had been brought in
France, where the recovery would always be exactly Iooo francs, and
no question of the date of exchange entered, the debtor's opportunities for gambling by withholding payment would be just as good as in
the cases we have just considered. Finally, the creditor is, in most
'Courts have not always realized this, aid have in a number of cases

chosen the rule which appeared, under the particular facts, to be the more
equitable. Consequently in some cases the bieach date rule was adopted, and
in others, the suit date rule. Barry v. Van den Hurk, infra note 4, at 7,2;
Lebaupin v. Crispin, infra note 4, at 722; HIawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629
(i87o).
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cases, able to avail himself of his right of action whenever he pleases.
If he does not act promptly, he is not to be pitied too much.
Since no distinction can be made between the breach date and
the suit date on their equities, and since no better rule has suggested
itself to the courts, the most important thing, undoubtedly, is for
the courts to choose one or the other and stick to it.3 The English
courts seem to have come closest to this goal, with a number of decisions applying the breach date,4 and only one case, 5 (overruled on
another point) 6 and one dictum ' questioning it. In the United
States there has been a good deal of authority for the judgment date
rule, that is, for the employment of the rate of exchange existing at
the time of the judgment." (This, as has been said, is materially
like the suit date rule, except that it delays unnecessarily the plaintiff's rights, after he has done all that was in his power to protect
'Peyrae v. Wilkinson, [1924] 2 K. B. 166, 168. Bailhach, J., said: "It is,
however, very important that the rule as to the date for calculating the rate
of exchange in the case of actions for debt should be certain. I therefore propose to follow the decision of Rowlatt, J., and to hold that the debt must be
converted at the rate of exchange current at the date when the debt became
due and payable."
4
Cash v. Kennion, Ii Ves. 314 (18o5); Scott v. Bevan, 2 B. & Ad. 78
)
(I831 ; Manners v. Pearson, [1898] I Ch. 581; Barry v. Van den Hurk, [192o]
2 K. B. 7o; Lebaupin v. Crispin, [1920] 2 K. B. 714; Di Ferdinando v. Simon,
Smits and Co., [1920] 3 K. B. 409; SS. Celia v. SS. Volturno, [1921] 2 A. C.
544; In re British-American Continental Bank, [1922] 2 Ch. D. 575; Uliendahl
v. Pankhurst, Wright & Co., 39 T. L. R. 628 (K. B. 1923); Peyrae v. Wilkinson, [1924] 2 K. B. 166.
'Kirsch v. Allen, 36 T. L. R. 59 (K. B. iig)); see also Cohn v. Boulken,
36 T. L. R. 767 (K. B. i92o), in which the court applied the judgment date
rule because of a mistaken belief that that was the rule in Scott v. Bevan, supra
note 4. See also Delegal v. Naylor, 7 Bing. 46o (1831).
636 T. L. R. 245 (A. C.

192o).

Soci~t6 des H6tels v. Cummings, [1922] 2 K. B. 451.
"Smith v. Shaw, Fed. Cas. No. 13107 (18o8) ; Cropper v. Nelson, Fed. Cas.
No. 3417 (1811); Murphy v. Camac, Fed. Cas. No. 9948 (1822); Grant v.
Healey, Fed. Cas. No. 5696 (1839); The Blohm, Fed. Cas. No. I556 (1867);
The Saigon Maru, 267 Fed. 881 (D. C. Ore. 192o); The Hurona, 268 Fed. 91o
(S. D. N. Y. I92O); Liberty National Bank v. Burr, 27o Fed. 251 (E. D. Pa.
1921) ; and see the cases cited in Gluck, supra note i, at 227, nn. 4o and 41, at

nn. 42 and 43; Marburg v. Marburg, 26 Md. 8 (1866); Capron v. Adams,
28 Md. 529 (1868) ; Comstock v. Smith, 2o Mich. 338 (187o) ; Robinson v. Hall,
28 How. Prac. 342 (N. Y. 1864); Revillon v. Demme, 114 Misc. 1, I85 N. Y.
Supp. 443 (1920); Sirie v. Godfrey, ig6 App. Div. 529, I88 N. Y. Supp. 52
228,

(1921)

; Richard v. American Union Bank, 241 N. Y. 163, 149 N. E. 338 (1925) ;

Taan v. Le Gaux, i Yeates 204 (Pa. 1793) ; Lee v. Wilcocks, 5 S. and R. 48 (Pa.
i819) ; Benners v. Clemens, 58 Pa. 24 (1868); Scott v. Hornsby, I Call 41
(Va. 1797); Hawes v. Woolcock, 26 Wis. 629 (I87O) ; and see STOREY, CONFLICr OF LAws (8th ed. 1883), §§ 3o8-313; SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4th ed.
1916), § 213.
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himself.) There are also a number of cases decided according to
the breach date rule.9 Often within the same jurisdiction there is
conflict.Y
There had been no cases squarely on the point decided in the
United States Supreme Court until very recently, when two decisions were handed down which throw a new light on the subject. The
first of these was Hicks v. Guiness," in which the pertinent facts
were that a number of francs were due to the plaintiff in New York,
and that he sued -for them in this country. The rate of exchange applied to convert the francs into dollars was the rate existing at the date
when the francs first became due. The other case was Deutsche Bank
v. Humphrey," in which a number of marks were due in Germany,
and, later, suit was brought for them in America. The rate of exchange applied was the rate of the date that the suit was brought.
The two cases were differentiated as follows: In Hicks v. Guiness, the
francs being payable in New York, a right of action arose at once
under the laws of New York, and the damages were the value of the
francs in New York on the day they should have been delivered. In
the Deutsche Bank case, the marks were payable in Germany under
the German law; when the contract was broken the German law gave
a right of action to the creditor to sue in Germany for the number
of marks. There was no contract right in this country, and no right
of action accrued here upon the breach in Germany. The plaintiff
'Jelison v. Lee, Fed. Cas. No. 7256 (1847); Forbes v. Murray, Fed. Cas.
No. 4928 (1869) ; Spreckels v. The Weatherby, 48 Fed. 734 (E. D. Pa. i8gi) ;
The Verdi, 268 Fed. 9o8 (S. D. N. Y. 192o); Page v. Levenson, 281 Fed.
555 (D. C. Md. 1922); Dante v. Miniggio, 298 Fed. 845 (Ct of App. D. C.
1924); Wichita Mill v. Naamlooze, 3 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925); McKiel v. Porter, 4 Ark. 534 (1842) ; Grunwald v. Freese, 34 Pac. 73 (Cal. 1893) ;
Warnock v. Fleming, 2oo Ill. App. 22 (1916); Simonoff v. Granite City Nat.
Bank, 279 Ill. 248, 116 N. E. 636 (1917); Stringer v. Coombs, 62 Me. i6o
(1873) ; Rasst v. Morris, 135 Md. 243, 104 Ad. 412 (igg) : Hussey v. Farlow,
91 Mass. 263 (1864); Sheehand v. Dalrymple, ig Mich: 239 (1869); Katcher
v. American Express Co., 94 N. J. L. 165, lO9 Ad. 741 (192o) ; Pavenstadt v.
New York Life Insurance Co., 2o3 N. Y. 91, 96 N. E. 104 (I9II); Gross v.
Mendel, 25 N. Y. 633, 121 N. E. 871 (1918); Hoppe v. Russo-Asiatic Bank,
235 N. Y. 37, 138 N. E. 497 (1923)'; and see the cases cited in Gluck, supra note
I, at 226, n. 37; SEDmwcK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912), §§ 273, 274.
" Federal courts: Jelison v. Lee, Forbes v. Murray, Spreckels v. The
Weatherby, Page v. Levenson, Dante v. Miniggio, Wichita Mill v. Naamlooze,
all supra note 9 (breach date rule) ; The Hurona, The Saigon Maru, Liberty
Nat. Bank v. Burr, all supra note 8 (judgment date rule) ; see cases cited in
Gluck, loc. cit. supra note 8, Michigan: Sheehan v. Dalrymple, supra note 9
(breach date rule) ; Comstock v. Smith, supra note 8 (judgment date rule). New
York: Pavenstadt v. New York Life Insurance Co., Gross v. Mendel, Hoppe v.
Russo-Asiatic Bank, all supra note 9 (breach date rule); Revillon v. Demme,
Sirie v. Godfrey, Richard v. American Union Bank, all supra note 8 (judgment
date rule).
11269 U. S. 71 (1925).
'U. S. Sup. Ct, decided Nov. 23, 1926.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

452

LAW REVIEW

acquired no rights whatever under our law until he brought suit
here. 13
The theory upon which these cases are based-namely, that
fundamentally, an obligation is local and dependent upon the law
under which it arose-is supported by a number of cases cited4 in the
One
opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Deutsche Bank case.,
of these, Davis v. Mills,' was a case of a suit brought outside of
Montana on a Montana statute creating a certain liability for directors of corporations. The cause of action accrued in 1893. In 1897
the Montana legislature passed a statute limiting the liability of directors, created by the former statute, to three years. This new
statute was construed by the court not as a statute of limitations but
as intended to be part of the original statute creating the liability.
In other words, the limitation went to the essence of the liability.
This action was begun after 1897, but before the statute of limitations had run in the jurisdiction where suit was brought. The court
held that the plaintiff could not succeed, having begun the action
after the defendant's liability had ceased to exist. That is, the liability had existed only under the laws of Montana; it was purely
local, and when it ceased to exist there, it ceased altogether. It may
be that some would not agree with this fundamental conception of
the law. But for a court that does, the conclusion arrived at in the
Deutsche Bank case would seem to be correct. Under the same reasoning, if the German government had passed a retroactive law which
had the effect of wiping out the debt sued on in that case, before
suit was brought in this country, there could have been no recovery
at all. Another case supporting the same general proposition is
Slater v. Mexican National R. R. Co. 16 The following quotation is
from the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes:
"The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act
complained of was subject to no law having force in the forum,
it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the
person may be found. But as the only source of this obligation
is the law of the place of the act, it follows that the law determines not merely the existence of the obligation, but equally determines its extent. It seems to us unjust to allow a plaintiff
"See also Sutherland v. Mayer, 271 U. S. 272 (1926). This was an accounting and winding-up of a partnership. Some of the funds were in Germany and some in America. The court decided that in an equitable action of
this sort, where the sums were so confused, the rate of exchange existing on
the day when the various sums became due was the proper one to apply.

14 Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the opinions in both Hicks v. Guiness, supra
note ii, and Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey, supra note 12, and also in Davis v.
Mills, 194 U. S.451 (9o4), and Slater v. Mexican Nat. R. R., i94 U. S. 120

(1904).

note 14.
" Supra note 14, at 126.
"Supra
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to come here absolutely depending on the foreign law for the
foundation of his case, and yet to deny the defendant the benefit
of whatever limitations on his liability that law would impose."
Presumably, the theory upon which the breach date rule rests is
that the obligation of the debtor becomes the personal property of
the creditor the moment it accrues; and this he carries around with
him no matter where he goes. His right is to the amount of the obligation the moment it became due, measured according to the standard
of whatever currency is used in the jurisdiction where suit is brought.
This line of reasoning seems as sound as the other. To be of any
practical value, of course, the creditor's right of action must be supported by some sort of law. If it is admitted that the law of the
jurisdiction where the right arose is the only support, then the theory
of the Supreme Court is admitted, and the breach date rule cannot
logically stand. If it is said that the right is supported by a sort
of general law, the only answer is to deny the existence of a general
law. Perhaps the most that should be said here, is that the burden
of proof should be upon those who wish to rely on the general law.
At least it can be said that this line of reasoning is not a solid foundation for the breach date rule. The view may be taken, however, that
the law which supports the right is the law of each separate jurisdiction
where suit may be brought upon the obligation. That is, as soon as
an obligation is created under the law of one state, the law of every
other state stretches out a hand and makes that obligation part of
itself. A possible difficulty comes to mind, if this view is taken;
namely, that if the state in which the obligation was created should
pass a retroactive law wiping out the obligation, the effect would
be either to annul an obligation in states over which the first
state had no power, or to create a situation in which foreign states
would enforce as an obligation a state of facts which in the particular state did not amount to an obligation-that is, they would be
enforcing a void law, But the obvious answer to this is that the
other states are enforcing a valid obligation each under its own
laws.
Other chains of reasoning have been suggested in support of the
above theory; but they seem to beg the question. For example, it
might be said that since interest must be paid on an obligation from
the first, that the original obligation is clearly the sum owed. But
you can get nowhere by saying that interest is owed because the
obligation was due from the first; and that the obligation was due
from the first because interest was payable from then on. Similarly
it has been said that foreign money is like a commodity, and that,
therefore, damages for a failure to pay it should be estimated by its
value at the time of the breach. 17 This settles nothing. If there was
no obligation to pay it in the jurisdiction where suit is brought, the
ZSupra note 12, p. 2

of Mr. Justice Sutherland's dissenting opinion.

454

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

foreign money cannot be treated as a commodity at the time of the
breach of contract but must be looked upon as the currency of the
place where the obligation was due. But if there was an obligation
to pay, then the foreign money should, of course, be treated as a
commodity.
It appears, then, that there are two ways of thinking, neither
of which can be preferred to the other on very definite grounds. One
supports the breach date rule; the other supports the suit date rule.
The latter was made clear for the first time in the very recent case of
the Deutsche Bank v. Humphrey,5 whereas the former has been
more or less clear for some time. A number of cases were cited
as supporting the breach date rule. But on examination of the facts
of these cases it will be discovered that only a few 19 actually do so.
In the majority of the cases the foreign money was due in the jurisdiction where suit was brought, or there was some other reason that
made the application of the breach date rate of exchange correct
under both the breach date and the suit date rules.20
The courts have been most obscure, as a general rule, in assigning -reasons for their decisions. Often the only reason given is an
equity this way or that, that the court sees in the rule it has chosen.
But as has been shown neither rule has the advantage of equities.
And both rules are based on fundamental principles, to go beyond
which would be a task for the philosopher or the psychologist. It
seems, then, that the best solution would be for the courts to choose
the easier rule to apply. Perhaps the breach date rule is preferable,
viewed in this light; for then the exchange on the breach date is the
only one that need ever be considered.
0.1. W.
ULTRA VIRES AS A DEFENSE TO EXECUTORY CONTRACT MADE BY
CORPORATION IN VIOLATION OF STATUTORY PROHIBITION-A corporation, having a general power to contract, is restricted as to the
amount of its indebtedness, dependent upon a certain contingency.
It contracts in violation of this restriction. In a suit by the corporation on the contract, still wholly executory, can the other party defend on the ground that it is ultra vires the corporation? This ques"Supra note 12.
"Scott v. Bevan, Barry v. Van den Hurk, Lebaupin v. Crispin, Peyrae v.
Wilkinson, all supra note 4; Page v. Levenson, Dante v. Miniggio, Wichita
Mill v. Naamlooze, Grunwald v. Freese, Warnock v. Fleming, all supra note 9.
o SS. Celia v. SS. Volturno, Di Ferdinando v. Simon Smits Co., In re
British-American Bank, Uliendahl v. Pankhurst, all supra note 4; Jelison v.
Lee, Forbes v. Murray, Spreckels v. The Weatherby, The Verdi, McKiel v.
Porter, Simonoff v. Granite City National Bank, Stringer v. Coombes, Hussey
v. Farlow, Sheehan v. Dalrymple, Rasst v. Morris, Katcher v. American Express Co., Gross v. Mendel, all supra note 9.

NOTES
tion was presented in the recent case of Brown v. Dillard,' which
arose in a federal district court in Texas. The court there decided
that "if a corporation enters into a contract in good faith, under
which its liability is in excess of the amount permitted by the statute
of its birth, and neither the state nor a stockholder takes steps to
cancel it, and when the statute does not make such a contract void,
the court will not declare it void upon the suggestion of the defaulting party."
The plaintiff was a Louisiana corporation. In July it contracted
to buy cotton from the defendants, cotton dealers in Texas, for delivery in November or December at twenty-one cents per pound.
The defendants refused to deliver on the ground that the contract
was in violation of a Louisiana statute I which provided that no corporation should make contracts in excess of the amount paid in on
its capital stock. The amount involved in the contract was $I3,ooo,
while the capital paid in as of that date was $i2,5oo. Within sixty
days after the making of said contract, and several months before
the date set for the delivery of the cotton, the capital stock was paid
in in full. The plaintiff, having resold the cotton in advance of delivery, was forced to buy on the open market at a price considerably
higher than the price agreed upon with the defendants. It then sued
for the difference, and recovery was permitted.
The court in its opinion defined a contract, ultra vires "in the
true sense," 3 as one which is "outside of the object of its [the corporation's] creation as defined in. its charter and in the law of its
organization," and said that such a contract is void. 4 It is in a class
by itself, the objection to it being: "not merely that the corporation
ought not to have made it, but that it could not make it. It is not voidable only, but wholly void, and of no legal effect." r
There is another class of cases involving contracts on the part of
the corporation which it is not empowered to make by its charter
or by statute, either expressly or impliedly, and yet which are not
declared by the statute to be void. They are called ultra vires the
corporation, but they have nevertheless been enforced in this coun115 F. (2d) 4o8 (N. D. Tex. 1926).
'LA. CoNsT. & STAT. (Wolff, 1920) 305.
'See Buck Creek Lumber Co. v. Nelson, 188 Ala. 243, 246, 66 So. 476, 478
(1914), where the court said: "Strictly speaking, a corporate act is said to be
ultra vires when it is not within the scope of the powers of the corporation to
perform it under any circumstances or for any purpose." And 3 FLrcHER,
CORPORATIONS (1917) 2570: "Possibly there is no term in the whole law used
as loosely and with so little regard to its strict meaning As the term ultra vires.
An ultra ,ires contract . . . is one not within the express or implied powers
of the corporation as fixed by its charter, the st'auies or the common law."
'The court had in mind contracts which are clearly prohibited, "either by
a general statute or the charter." See First National Bank v. Converse, 2o
U. S. 425 (19o5); De La Vergne Machine Co. v. Savings Institution, 175 U. S.
4o (1899) ; Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman, 139 UJ. S. 24 (189o) ; 3 FLErcHE,
op. cit. supra note 3 §16i2.
'Mr. Justice Gray in Central Trans. Co. v. Pullman, supra note 4, at 59.
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try when they have been either fully executed I or executed on one
side.7 But when such contracts are purely executory on both sides,
the general rule, firmly backed by a long line of decisions, is that they
are not capable of enforcement, either by an action for specific
performance or for damages, and no estoppel can arise to deny their
validity.8 The lone outstanding case often cited as an exception to
this rule is that of Harris v. Independence Gas Co. But it is submitted that this case has often been misinterpreted. It involved an
attempt to cancel certain portions of a lease which had already been
made, hence it was not really an executory contract at all, and the
same result would probably have been reached in the majority of
jurisdictions in this country.1"
There is a third class of cases involving contracts on the part of
the corporation, which it could make for some purposes but not for
others. For example, suppose a corporation, having the general
power to borrow money, should borrow for a purpose expressly or
impliedly prohibited by statute or its charter. Here, unquestionably,
such a prohibition will not invalidate a contract made with a party
in good faith, if it has been fully executed or executed on one side.11
In spite of such prohibition, the courts, in interpreting the intention
of the legislature in framing the statute, hold that it was never in'First National Bank v. Stewart, 107 U. S. 676 (1882) ; Holmes, etc. Co. v.
Holmes & Wessel, 127 N. Y. 252, 27 N. E. 831 (i8gi). And see 3 FLETCHER,
op cit. supra note 3 §I559.
'Bath Gaslight Co. v. Claffy, 151 N. Y. 24, 45 N. E. 390 (1896) ; Whitney
Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62 (875); 3 FLETCHER, op Cit. supra note 3
§1543, but see §1539 for English and Federal rule recognizing ultra vires doctrine as to such contracts.
'E. g. National Finance Co. v. Cramer, 156 Minn. 79, 194 N. W. lo8
(1923), where the corporation, authorized to deal in land, bonds, and stocks, was
not allowed to contract for road construction; Safety Insulated Wire Co. v.
Baltimore, 76 Fed. 363 (C. C. A. 4th, 1896), where the corporation, chartered
to manufacture wire, was not allowed to contract for underground subway
work; and Jemison v. Citizens Savings Bank, 122 N. Y. 135,25 N. E. 264 (189o),
where a bank had speculated in futures on the stock market. But see Eastern
Products Co. v. Tenn. Coal, etc. Co., 269 S. W. 4 (Tenn. 1925), a case very
similar to the principal case, involving shortage of paid-in capital. The court
permitted the defense of ultra vires on the grounds of bad faith and public
policy. And see cases cited in I4a C. J. 317 n. 74, L. R. A. 1917A 752, 3
FLETCHER, op cit. supra note 3 §1530.
976 Kan. 750, 92 Pac. 1123 (io7). That this decision was looked upon as
a startling new departure from the settled rule is attested from the words of an
eminent authority writing at about that time: "The Kansas court has adopted
the revolutionary doctrine that an action will lie upon a wholly executory ultra
vires contract and that the question of ultra vires can be raised only by the state.
It is not improbable that this decision will be followed by other courts of radical
tendencies and scant respect for mere authority." 2 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS
(i9o8) 858. This author credits Hon. George Wharton Pepper as being the
first one to advocate this doctrine. See 9 HARV. L. REV. 255 (1895).
0

See citations supra note 7.

t'See Miners Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 543, 578 (1869); Lucas v.
White Transfer Co., 70 Iowa 541 (1886) ; 3 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 3
§1593.
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tended that such prohibition should interfere with the sanctity of a
contract made in all good faith, under usual business conditions, and
not possibly detrimental to the interests of either party to the contract.12 And there seems to be no valid reason for distinguishing
such contracts from executory contracts of the same kind. The state,
it is true, might avail itself of its privilege under this prohibitory
clause. However, it is apprehended that it would not do so to avoid
a contract honestly entered into as above suggested, but it would
intervene only in a case of a flagrant abuse of power, to secure forfeiture of the corporation's charter.
There is yet another class of cases to which the .courts apply a
somewhat similar line of reasoning, cases in which the corporation
has been forbidden to contract except upon certain conditions. The
principal case belongs to this group. The plaintiff corporation had
undeniably been empowered to carry on its business in the usual way.
It had the general power to do everything necessary and incidental to
that business. Yet the restrictive clause was plainly written into the
statute involved, and it cannot be denied that the plaintiff violated
the letter of the prohibition. But the court, when it said: "It will not
do to confuse this case with the well-known and necessary safeguards
which prevent corporations from doing things that are not permitted
under the charter or under the statute," impliedly averred that the
corporation was not only not prohibited but was permitted by its
creator, the legislature, to conduct its business by contracting with
other parties. 13 And it reasoned that it was never the intention of
the legislature that the statutory prohibition should apply to a situation such as that of the principal case, where the corporation has
gone ahead and used an already granted power, but exercised it before the performance of the stipulated condition. And therefore
the contract was not ultra vires at all. The significance of such a
holding is only emphasized by the fact that it came from a federal
district court, which might naturally have inclined toward the rather
rigid federal rule of ultra vires,14 which denies redress even where
the contract has been fully executed on one side. Under the view
which the court takes that the prohibition in the statute was not in'Even in England, where the defense of ultra vires is rigidly maintained,
it is held that a contract which upon its face is valid and within the powers of
the corporation is enforceable if the corporation has power to make the contract
under certain conditions or for certain purposes, provided such contract is fully
executed or executed on one side. Norwich v. Norfolk Ry., 4 E. & B. 396
(Eng. 1855).

"See Scherer & Co. v. Everest; i68 Fed. 822, 828 (C. C. A. 8th, i99),
where in a similar situation Sanborn, J., said:-"But the statutes did not provide
that notes or contracts issued by the corporation wvhich created an indebtedness
beyond the limit thus prescribed should be void, and it is not the province of the
courts to impose a penalty for the violation of a statute in which there is no
moral turpitude or breach of public policy where the law fails to do so."
"Alabama Coal & Iron Co. v. Balto. Trust Co., 197 Fed. 347 (1912);
Merchants Bank v. Baird, i6o Fed. 642 (igo8); Anglo-American Land Co. v.
Lombard, 132 Fed. 721 (19o4).
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tended to apply to a situation as in the principal case, it is submitted
that such a rule can be applied to all cases where the corporation apparently violated a statutory or charter prohibition, but in fact was
within the purposes of its incorporation. This would include as well
the cases where the contracts have been fully executed or executed
on one side, thus making unnecessary any resort to the unsatisfactory
grounds of estoppel for permitting recovery upon such contracts.' 5
In view of the present tendency away from the old rigidity of
the ultra vires doctrine, 16 especially when the contract has been fully
executed or executed on one side, and since the justice and equity of
the situation lay with the corporation, it is submitted that the court
in the principal case evidenced an attitude of "sweet reasonableness,"
and was right in denying the plea of ultra vires and in holding the
contract valid."
D.H.P.

COMMON LAW

PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ARCHITECTURAL PLANS-

It is well settled at common law that an author has an exclusive property right in his original, intellectual production before it is published.' The author has a right not only to the material on which the
thoughts are expressed, but also to the intangible and incorporeal
property in the intellectual creation arising from the right to make a
copy of the production.2 This intangible property is so distinct from
the physical substance in which it is embodied that the incorporeal
property right may be in one person while the title to the physical
thing is in another. 3
"'The foundation of all rights of this description is the
natural dominion which every one has over his own ideas, the
enjoyment of which, although they are embodied in visible forms
' The court seems to have this idea in mind in Grand Valley v. Zumbrunn,
Fed. 943 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921), and Kirven v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co.,
145 Fed. 288 (C. C. A. 4th, 19o6), with which compare Eastern Prod. Co. v.
Tenn. Coal Co., supra note 8.
See MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 1027, and Pepper, supra note 9, at 26o.
11See Charles E. Carpenter, Should the Doctrine of Ultra Vires Be Discarded? 33 YALE L. J. 49 (923); and Scarborough, Ultra Vires No Defense
in Private Contracts, ii Ky. L. J. 197 (1922). In Holm v. Claus Lipsius Brewing Co., 21 App. Div. 204, 207, 47 N. Y. Supp. 518, 520 (1897), the court said:
"There is no reason why the doctrine of ultra vires should ever have been
applied to private corporations any more than to the powers of individuals in a
partnership."
272

'DRONE, COPYRIGHT (1879) 10I. The English Copyright Act of 1911, I &
Geo. V. c. 46 §31, has abrogated this common law right in literary property,
so that all rights must be claimed under the statute. The Act, however, gives
copyright in unpublished works. Ibid. §i. On the other hand the United States
Copyright Act is specific in preserving this common law right. 35 STAT. 7076
(I909), U. S. COMP. STAT. (I918) §9518.
2Ibid. 98.
'Ibid. 99; Werckmeister v. American Lith. Co., 142 Fed. 827 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1905).
2

NOTES

or characters, he may, if he chooses, confine to himself or impart
to others.' That is, the law recognizes the artistic or literary
productions of intellect or genius, not only to the extent which
is involved in dominion over and ownership of the thing created,
but also the intangible estate in such property which arises from
the privilege of publishing and selling to others copies of the
thing produced." 4
This literary property in an unpublished work is governed and
protected by the same rules and remedies that are accorded to other
forms of personal property.5 "The right is property in its essential
features. It is, therefore, entitled to all the protection which the
Constitution and laws give to property." 8
The foregoing principles have been held to be applicable to
architectural plans and drawings, and our purpose shall be to ascertain the nature and extent of an artichitect's rights at common law in
his own work before publication, apart from any title to the corporeal paper on which it is expressed, by a perusal of some of the
adjudications on the subject.
In an early Pennsylvania case, Gendell v. Orr,7 the plaintiff,
who had erected a porch which he alleged was of a novel and artistic
design, sought to restrain the defendants from erecting a porch of
the same design. The court, while it refused to protect the plaintiff,
did so only on the ground that.the embodiment of the plans in an
existing structure which had stood for several years open to the
public gaze was a publication thereof, so that the plaintiff, at common
law, no longer had any property in his design. The architect's property right before publication in plans created by him was, however,
expressly recognized.
This same question arose several years later in the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court in the case of Wright v.
Eisle.s There the plaintiff, an architect, after preparing plans for
the construction of -a residence, filed them with the city building department and superintended the construction of the building, receiv'Justice Day in American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 2o7 U. S. 284, 291
(1907).
"The right to literary property is just as sacred, and just as much entitled
to the protection of the law, as the right to any other kind of personal property.
Its acquisition and succession are governed by the same legal rules which control
the acquisition and succession of other property of the same general class, and,
if the rights of its owner are violated, he is entitled to the same remedies to
which the owner of other personal property may resort for redress." Aronson
v. Baker, 43 N. J. Eq. 365, 367, 12 AtI. 177, 178 (1887).
'Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 604, 97 N. E. iog, iii (igiz).
713 Phila. 191 (i879).
'86 App. Div. 356, 83 N. Y. Supp. 887 (9o3). It appears in this case that
the defendant had seen the residence erected by the plaintiff, and after being
informed of the price the plaintiff would require for a duplicate of the plans,
had gone to the second architect.
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ing payment therefor. The plaintiff sued to recover the value of the
plans from the defendant, alleging that the plans furnished by the
defendant's architect in the erection of the defendant's building, were
copies of his plans. The court decided that the plaintiff could not
recover because the filing of the plans constituted a publication and
that, therefore, the plaintiff no longer had any exclusive right in the
design or in its reproduction, as was held by the court in Gendell v.
Orr.9 However, here too, the court clearly affirmed the common law
property right in plans before publication, stating that the architect
has an exclusive right to be the first one to publish his work, a right
which can not be taken away from him without his consent.
The problem was again presented to the New York Supreme
Court in the recent case of Larkin v. P. R. R. 11 In this case
the plaintiff, an architect, submitted certain plans to the defendants
with the expectation of being awarded the construction of a hotel.
He subsequently sued the defendants for damages on the ground
that after receiving the plans the defendants had made substantial
use of them in the preparation of another set of plans and in the
actual construction of their building. Here again the complaint
was dismissed, the court finding that there was "neither copying of a
plan nor pilfering of an original idea," but the decision recognized
the architect's right of compensation for the value of plans actually
appropriated by another in the construction of a building.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the quite recent case of
Mackay and Webber v. Benjamin Franklin Realty & Holding Co."
once more encountered the problem in a most interesting form. One
Webber, an architect, had prepared plans for a company which contemplated erecting a hotel in Philadelphia, but in 1921 Webber died
and the company disbanded, being succeeded in 1923 by the defendant
corporation. The defendant corporation employed one T to prepare
the necessary plans and superintend the construction of the building,
which he did. Webber's executor brought this suit against the defendant corporation, the owner of the hotel, on the ground that T,
in preparing his plans and specifications had made an unauthorized
use of those previously drawn by Webber, and that the plans thus
appropriated were used in the construction of the defendant's building. The action was in trespass, formerly trover, for the recovery
of the value of these plans (trespass including trover under the present procedure in Pennsylvania). The trial judge directed a verdict for
the defendant on the ground that the defendant corporation did not
know that the Webber plans were being used. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court in the following language:
'Supra note 7.
0i25 Misc. 238,

210 N. Y. Supp. 374 (Sup. Ct 1925)..

" The case has not as yet been reported. It was argued Dec. 3, 1926, before
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on an appeal from the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas No. I, of Philadelphia County.

NOTES

"The T plans, which were used, were copies, or near copies
of the Webber plans and so the gravamen of the plaintiff's case
is that the ideas in the Webber plans were appropriated by T
in preparing the plans used in the construction of the building,
but admittedly the defendant had no knowledge of such appropriation. .......
at most all that plaintiffs contend actually
went into the hotel were the Webber ideas, but no physical property, which belonged to his estate. .
. no authority was
cited and we know of none where such action (trover and conversion) has been sustained for something so entirely intangible
as an idea, not connected with physical property. Doubtless
trover might be maintained for the actual conversion of plans,
but the defendant had no knowledge of the Webber plans; never
saw or heard of them."
The decision would seem to rest on the fact that the action
brought conformed to the action of trover, and if this is so, the decision of the court can easily be sustained, for although it has frequently been said that'trover may be brought for the conversion of
every species of personal property even though not tangible,1 2 this
has not been carried out in practice. No court, apparently, has applied this broad statement beyond allowing trover to lie for the conversion of shares of stock, and permitting recovery for the value
of the stock represented by the certificate. 13 And it is evident that
in such a case there has been a conversion of actual tangible property, namely, the certificate, for .which replevin or detinue might
have been brought. However, in the Benjamin Franklin case there
could be no such thing as a recovery of the plans in specie from the
defendant corporation, since it never had possession of anything
physical belonging to the plaintiff and, of course, could not hand
over the mere ideas that were used by another in erecting its building. Consequently, the Pennsylvania Court was merely following
established precedent in refusing to allow the action of trover to be
"sustained for something so entirely intangible as an idea."
Conceding then, that the decision of the court in the Benjamin
Franklin case was correct, inasmuch as the plaintiff sued in what was
really an action of trover, our problem shall be to determine whether
" "At common law, trover lay only for tangible property, capable of being
identified and taken into actual possession, but the fiction on which the action of
trover was founded, namely, that a defendant had found the property of another,
which was lost, has become, in the progress'of the law, an unmeaning thing,
which has been discarded by most courts; so that the action no longer exists as
it did at common law, but has been developed into a remedy for the conversion
of every species of personal property." 26 R. C. L. io99.
" Other courts refuse to follow this view and deny that trover will lie for
the conversion of corporate stock, as such, on the ground that it is incorporeal
and hence not the subject of an action of trover. See 26 R. C. L. 1lO5.
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any other action to recover the value of the plans could be sustained
under a similar set of facts. 4
It might be helpful at this point to compare the Benjamin
Franklin case with the three preceding cases. The most striking difference lies in the fact that in the previous cases the action was
brought against the one into whose hands the plaintiff's plans actually
came or who was actually making use of or copying the plaintiff's
plans with knowledge of their authorship, while in the Benjamin
Franklin case the defendant was innocent of the use of the Webber
plans and performed no act himself. Should this make a difference
in arriving at a decision in these cases?
In this connection the English case of Mansell v. Valley Printing
Co.," which bears some similarity to the Benjamin Franklin case,
may prove of assistance. The plaintiff was the exclusive owner of
two pictures and designs suitable for advertisements which had been
produced for him by an artist. One Rankine, another artist in the
plaintiff's employ, surreptitiously made copies of these pictures, and,
after leaving the plaintiff's employ, sold these copies as original
drawings to the defendant company who published them without
knowledge of the plaintiff's title. The plaintiff thereupon commenced an action in the court of chancery against the defendant
company and Rankine, claiming an injunction and damages. The
court allowed the plaintiff to recover judgment against both defendants for damages (which was the cost of the pictures), and issued
an order for delivery to the plaintiff of all copies of his pictures. On
appeal the judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the court deciding that "the owner of an unpublished picture could, at common
law and apart from statutory protection, recover damages against a
person who had, innocently and in good faith, published a pirated
copy of the picture."
In neither the Mansell case nor the Benjamin Franklin case
did the defendant company convert anything physical belonging to
the plaintiff, and in both cases the defendant company was innocent,
having no knowledge of any right in the plaintiff. However, in the
Mansell case the defendant company itself published the picture,
while in the Benjamin Franklin case the defendant, as we have
already seen, did nothing. In the latter case the defendant company
was sued not because of something it had actually done but because
"In the words of Farwell, L. J., in Mansell v. Valley Printing Co., infra
note 15, at 446: "Every invasion of a right of property gives a cause of action
for damages to the owner against the invader, whether the invasion be intentional or not, and whether it be innocent or malicious. This applies to all
rights of property, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, the only difference
being in the form of action applicable in former days. Thus . . . in trover
damages were claimed for interference with the right to possession, or for the
wrongful conversion, of specific goods and chattels, while the remedy for injury
to incorporeal rights of property was case or trespass on the case."
15[i9o8] 2 Ch. 441. See supra note i, for the effect of the English Copyright Act.

NOTES

it had received the benefit of the act of its architect T in appropriating and using the plaintiff's plans in constructing its building. Is
this difference sufficient to justify two contrary judicial decisions?
Let us suppose that in the Benjamin Franklincase the defendant company had merely begun to erect the building. Can there be
any doubt that on the authority of the previous cases a court of equity
would have enjoined the defendant from proceeding further in the
contruction? .Certainly such action would be justified in order to
protect the plaintiff's property right in his plans and give him the
first right to use or publish them. Then why is it not just as clear
that the defendant, having completed the building and received the
benefit of the plans, must account to the plaintiff, who has been deprived of his property? That result would seem to follow logically
if we apply the principles previously expounded. Since, as we have
seen, this literary property is personal property which may invoke
the protection applicable to other forms of property, it would seem
that the defendant company had no rights in the plaintiff's plans because its architect, T, had no rights in them himself, and therefore
could convey none to the defendant. 6 Had this been tangible property, as, for example, bricks which had been used in constructing the
defendant's building, could there be any doubt that the plaintiff, as
owner, could have followed them and recovered their value from the
defendant? Then what matters it that instead of tangible property
we have intangible property, if this intangible property is such that
it has the same protection given'to tangible property? If we deny
recovery to the plaintiff for his plans, are we not denying that this
literary property is "property in its essential features
. . entitled to all the protection which the Constitution and laws give to
property?" 17 And yet, though this would seem to be a logical conclusion, the important question remains whether a court would extend the analogy between tangible and intangible property so as to
reach such a result and thus compel an innocent person to pay twice
(having already paid his own architect) for -mere ideas, when he
himself has done nothing.
N.L.E.
POWER OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION TO ORDER A CORPORATION TO DIVEST ITSELF OF PHYSICAL PROPERTY AND ASSETS
OBTAINED THROUGH UNLAWFUL INTERCORPORATE SHAREHOLDING

-The viewpoint of the economist that competition in all fields of
business does not produce maximum gain, but that combinations of

""And as a person can convey no better title to property than he has, so a
purchaser from one without title gets nothing, for a bad title is not made good
by ignorance of the purchaser nor his lack of knowledge of a better title than
that of his vendor." BowERs, THE LAW OF CONVERSION (1917) §39.
'TSupra note 6.
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business properly controlled are conducive to such gain,' finds implied legal support in the interpretation of the Clayton Act 2 as applied by the United States Supreme Court to three sets of facts presented for review and decision in a like number of cases. While this
is not the express basis upon which the Court places its decision, the
recognition by name of economic principles not being the practice of
this or other courts, it is apparent from these and previous holdings
of the Court that it is interpreting anti-trust legislation in the light
of present economic thought rather than from the viewpoint of Congress and the country when the legislation was passed.3 It is perhaps
the result of applying the legislation in the light of legislative intent
when economic loss will not be great, and in the light of economic
principles where the loss will be substantial, that has led to the holdings of the Court in the three recent cases arising from orders of the
Federal Trade Commission.
The Federal Trade Commission under the power vested in that
body by § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act4 and §§ 7 and ii
of the Clayton Act found that the acquisition of stock of a competing
company by the Western Meat Company,5 which stock was about to
be used to acquire the plant of the competing company, and the acquisition of the stock of other competing companies by Thatcher Manufacturing Co.6 and Swift & Co.,' which stock had been used to secure
the property of these competing companies, constituted violations of
the Clayton Act by substantially lessening competition, and of the
Federal Trade Commission, Act by the engagement in unfair methods
of competition. The Commission ordered the first named offender
to so divest itself of the stock of the competing company as to include
in such divestment the latter's plant and property, not yet acquired.
It ordered the other two offenders to divest themselves of the stock
and property of the competing companies. The Supreme Court affirmed the first order, since the purpose of the Clayton Act might be
wholly defeated if the stock could be further used to secure the competitor's business." But the Court refused to affirm the other orders,
holding that the Commission's power is limited under the Clayton Act
EDDY, THE NEw COMPETITION
& COMBINATION (1916)
EcONOMIcS (1919) 329-332.

TION

(1912);

HANEY,

BUSINESS

ORGANIZA-

132-138; FISHER, ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF

730 (1914), U. S. ComP. STAT. (1918) §§8835a-8835k
'United States v. U. S. Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1919) ; United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Co., 222 Fed. 349 (D. C. Mass. 1915).
4
STAT. 717 (94), U. S. COMP. STAT. (I918) §§8836a-8836p.
'F. T. C. v. Western Meat Co., 5 F. T. C. D. 417 (2923).
'F. T. C. v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 6 F. T. C. D. 213 (2923).
238 STAT.

'F. T. C. v. Swift &Co., 5 F. T. C. D. 143 (1922).
'F. T. C. v. Western Meat Co., 47 Sup. Ct. 175 (1926).
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to an order requiring the guilty person to divest itself of the stock
and make no further use of it.'
Four Justices dissented from the decisions of the Court in the
Thatcher and the Swift cases. Mr. justice Brandeis,"0 whose dissenting opinion is reported in part, argues that the orders of the Commission should have been affirmed because § 7 of the Clayton Act was
intended to prevent not only the peculiar evils incident to intercorporate shareholding, but also the evils "resulting therefrom," and
because § ii of"this Act gives the Commission power to act whenever it "shall have reason to believe that any person is violating or has
violated any of the provisions of the earlier sections."
The difference in the opinions of the justices immediately raises
the question: what is a correct statutory interpretation of §§ 7 and ii
of the Clayton Act. Section 7 contains an inhibition against the acquisition of the stock of another corporation by a corporation engaged
in commerce, where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is acquired and the corporation making the acquisition. Section ii gives the Trade Commission authority to enforce compliance with § 7 whenever it has reason
to believe that any person is violating or has violated any provisions
of that section, by issuing an order requiring such person to desist
from such violations and divest itself of the stock held. It would
seem the object to which these sections are directed is not the mere
prohibition of the acquisition of stock of one corporation by another.
It is directed to the "effect" of such acquisition upon commerce."And the question before us is whether the inhibitions of such sections of the Act apply to the effect of intercorporate stock purchases
upon commerce prior to action by the Commission; that is, has the
Commission under the authority of §§ 7 and ii of the Clayton Act
complete power to restore competition in interstate commerce interrupted by the effect of intercorporate shareholdings, or must other
anti-trust legislation be invoked to obtain this result?
From a study of the language of the statute, divorced from any
other consideration, it is submitted that the dissenting justices are
correct in their conclusion that the decisions of the Commission in
the Thatcher and the Swift cases were within its power. The words
of § ii, "whenever... any person ...has violated ...the provisions
of § 7," 12 are clearly a grant of authority to the Commission over
stated past acts of the offender at any time they have the effect of subtantially lessening interstate competition; while the nature of the
power of the Commission under such circumstances, defined in the
'Thatcher Manufacturing Co. v. F. T. C., 47 Sup. Ct. i75 (1926); Swift
& Co. v. F. T. C., ibid.
"' Chief Justice Taft, and Justices Holmes and Stone, joined inthis dissent.
'See F. T. C. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 284 Fed. 401, 405 (C. C. A.
3d, 1922).

Italics mine.
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words "issue ... an order requiring such person to desist from such
violation" is a general grant of power, purposely leaving, as we shall
see later, the details of each order to be worked out by the Commission. The additional words, "and divest itself of the stock held,"
plainly indicate that the Commission's authority is not limited to this
order since it is so phrased as to be of equal force with the power
to order an offender to desist from all violations of § 7. This section,
as previously stated, confines the inhibitions of that clause to cases
"where the effect may be substantially to lessen interstate competition." The word "effect" is broad in its connotation. It indicates
that any consequence, result, outcome or fruit of intercorporate
shareholding which may substantially lessen competition is prohibited.
The Commission having found that the intercorporate shareholding of Thatcher Manufacturing Company and of Swift & Company
had had the effect of substantially lessening interstate competition,
it would seem from the plain language of the Clayton Act that the
Commission had power to act under its grant of authority in § ii and
to issue such an order as was necessary to cause these companies to
desist from intercorporate shareholding and to compel the retransfer
of property, aquired as a result thereof, the holding of which substantially lessened competition.
The history of the passage of the Clayton and the Trade Commission Acts affords even more convincing proof of the intention of
the framers of these Acts that the Commission should have complete
power to restore competition by divesting a combination of all fruits
of intercorporate shareholding. These Acts were passed as the result
of two main considerations: first, the general language in which the
Sherman Act 1" was couched made its interpretation as applied to
each new set of facts such an uncertainty 14 that business men demanded a means be afforded of knowing, with reasonable assurance in
advance, whether or not the law applied to a given state of facts;15
second, since dissolution of combinations by ordinary legal process
involved economic loss, it was thought an administrative commission
capable of directing and shaping such corrective processes would
aid."6
The Trade Commission Act merely declared that "unfair
2'26 STAT. 209

(i8go), U. S. CoMP.

STAT. (i918) §820

et seq.

"See Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 1, 63 (igiO) ; United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6, i8o (191o) ; BUTLER & LYNDE, FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, (1915) 1-4.
"5I CONG. REc. 2025 (1914),

Message of President Wilson, Jan. 20, 1914,
in which he outlined "changes which opinion deliberately sanctions and for which
business waits. It has long waited and suffered because it could not obtain
further and more explicit legislative definition of the policy and meaning of the
existing anti-trust law."
"Ibid. The dissolution of combinations "by ordinary legal process may
oftentimes involve financial consequences likely to overwhelm the security market and bring upon it breakdown and confusion. There ought to be an administrative commission capable of directing and shaping such corrective processes,
not only in aid of the courts but also by independent suggestion if necessary;"

NOTES
methods of competition in commerce" are unlawful. The meaning of
the term was not defined by the Act, leaving it to the Trade Commission and ultimately to the courts to apply this standard to the facts
of each particular case.'
But in the Clayton Act specific practices
are designated as unfair methods of competition so as to make certain these trade practices would not be found to be "fair" by the Commission or the courts."R Prominent among these was intercorporate
shareholding against which the prohibitions of § 7 are directed.
Prior, however, to the passage of these two laws, under the
power of the Sherman Act, intercorporate shareholding had been
condemned by the Court and a dissolution of the combinations involved ordered and a transfer of the property back to the various
subsidiary corporations directed. 9 When, therefore, the Clayton
Act was passed specifically giving power to the Trade Commission
to enforce the prohibition against intercorporate shareholding, so as
no longer to leave the condemnation thereof to the interpretations of
the courts under the Sherman -Act, it seems clear that the legislative
intent was that the Commission should be empowered to correct the
entire evil.
In Federal Trade Commission v. Western Meat Company the
Court recognizes this view by stating that "the statute must be read in
the light of its general purpose and applied with a view to effectuate
such purpose; preservation of established competition was the great
end which the legislature sought to secure. 20 If the purpose of the
Clayton Act as stated by the Court, namely, the preservation of a
competitiye economic system, sustains a construction of the Act prohibiting the acquisition of property which may further disrupt competition, it is difficult to discern why the same construction does not
support an order requiring divestment of property already obtained,
the holding of which is interfering with competition.
But even if this construction of the Clayton Act does not support
such a conclusion the Commission's order in Federal Trade Commission v. Swift & Company might nevertheless have been sustained
under the provisions of the Trade Commission Act on which it was
based. Section 5 of this Act declares unfair methods of competition
in commerce unlawful and gives the Commission power, whenever a
corporation has been or is using unfair methods of competition in
commerce, to issue an order requiring such corporation to desist from
these methods. The Commission found that the acquisition of stock
REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGN TEXT

PRINcIP Es, Appendix, (1912)

BooK, (1912) 272, 279; ROOSEVELT, PROGRESSIVE
319; STrsON, SOME LEGAL PHASES OF CORPO-

RATE FINANCING REORGANIZATION AND REGULATION,

1t

(I916) 275.

See F. T. C. v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441, 453

'HARLAN

(192I).

& McCANDLESS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1916), 26-28.
States v. Union Pacific Railway Co., 226 U. S. 61, 86, 95-96

"United
; United States v. American Tobacco Co., supra note 6, at 143-148, 176.
"See F. T. C. v. Sinclair Co., 261 U. S. 463, 476 (1922).

(1912)
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by Swift & Company, under the circumstances already set forth, constituted a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act and § 5 of the Trade
Commission Act and issued the order previously mentioned. In its
introductory remarks the Court refers to the terms of § 5 of the Trade
Commission Act but concludes with the remark, "this section is not
presently important." In reviewing the Swift decision, however, the
Court bases its conclusions entirely upon the authority of the Commission under the Clayton Act, omitting any consideration of its
power under § 5 of the Trade Commission Act. Since the power of
the Commission is so expressly extended under the above mentioned
provisions of the Trade Commission Act to past violations of the Act
by corporations, it is submitted that the Court, if its objective had
been a complete dissolution of the combinations involved, might
have found substantial support for the order of the Commission in
§ 5 of the Trade Commission Act.
Undoubtedly this was not the objective of the Court, since it
refused to attain it either through resort to controlling provisions
of the Trade Commission Act or a logical application of the purpose
of the Clayton Act, as stated by the Court or developed from the
language and history of this Act. Influenced, on the other hand, by
the economic principle that maximum gain may result from organized
combinations properly conducted, 21 the Court is, and has been, persistent in its refusal to place an interpretation on anti-trust legislation which will dissolve trusts whose existence has this economic justification. 22 It is, therefore, submitted that future interpretations of
anti-trust legislation may be expected to be narrowly applied in determining the legality of an act resulting in the creation of a trust.
The unlawful character of such a regulation is not to be ascertained
from the mere fact that it restrains competition, but from the nature
of the business affected, the restraint created and the economic purpose sought to be attained.
S.M.A.
SIn substance this was Chief Justice White's view of the rule of reason at
common law, which treated as illegal those contracts "which were unreasonably
restrictive of competitive conditions, either from the nature or character of the
contract or act or where the surrounding circumstances were such as to justify
the conclusion that they had not been entered into or performed with the legitimate purpose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and developing trade,
but on the contrary were such a character, as to give rise to the inference or
presumption that they had been entered into or done with the intent to do wrong
to the general public and to limit the right of individuals." See Standard Oil
Co. v. U. S., supra note 13 at 58.
'Chicago Board of Trade v. U. S., 246 U. S. 231 (igi8) ; United States
v. United Shoe Machinery Co., supra note 3, at 361, 362; United States v. U. S.
Steel Corp., supra note 3, at 457.

